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Abstract 
 
Although the global financial and economic crisis hurt economies worldwide, the economies at 
the southern Mediterranean region have done relatively well to weather this global hurricane. 
Economic growth in the region has slowed down but the size of the trough of these economies' 
business cycle has ultimately been dependent on the length and vigour of domestic economic 
policy reactions. Escaping from a difficult period featuring soaring food and oil prices the 
economies of the southern Mediterranean region are faced with new challenges that impact both 
their real and financial sectors, as negative effects from their real sector spilled over to their 
financial sectors. This chapter analyzes recent macroeconomic, monetary and financial 
developments, the use of fiscal, monetary and financial policy instruments, the volatility at their 
financial markets, trade openness and the imperative need for good governance which is the 
umbrella under which economic policy instruments are called to operate.   
 
1. Introduction 
 
The implementation of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) in the Mediterranean shore 
has been under strain over the last couple of years. While soaring food and oil prices imposed 
enormous pressure on government budgets and spurred a wave of inflationary pressure across 
the region in 2008, the Mediterranean countries (MED countries2, for short) started to feel the 
pinch of the global financial and economic crisis towards the last quarter of 2008 and  rushed  to 
come up with economic support packages for the sectors affected.  MED countries with stock 
markets felt the effects of the global financial turbulence with a lag of six months to a year after 
the moment where the developed countries started their tumble in July 2007. But the biggest 
shock to the MED economies came from the sharp drop in the world trade that directly affected 
their economic activity.  
 
Independent of the crisis, the gradual deepening of the ENP was somehow strengthened in 2008 
by the development of a new initiative: the Union for the Mediterranean was launched in July, 
sparking new hopes in the region and attracting a great deal of international attention to this 
region3. Overall, MED countries made significant progress in the implementation of the ENP 
                                                 
1 ECFIN.D3 “Economies of the Mediterranean Countries, the GCC, Russia, the New Independent States and EFTA countries”, Email: Maria-
Inmaculada.Montero-Luque@ec.europa.eu and Marga.Peeters@ec.europa.eu. Office: Avenue de Beaulieu/Beaulieulaan 24, 1160 Brussels – 
Belgium. This paper was written benefitting of input from Olha Nychai, Ronald Albers, Stylianos Dendrinos and Alexandra Janovskaia. We thank 
Loukas Stemitsiotis and Antonio de Lecea for their valuable comments. All errors are ours. 
Disclaimer: The views presented are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the European Commission. 
2  Including Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, occupied Palestinian territory, Syria and Tunisia.  
3 The July 2008 Paris Summit launched the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) with the objectives of providing a new political impetus to the EU’s 
critical relationship with its Mediterranean partners, providing greater co-ownership and making this relationship more concrete and visible through 
regional and sub-regional projects, building on the achievements of the Barcelona Process. The first set of projects to be developed under this 
initiative include the de-pollution of the Mediterranean Sea, the establishment of maritime and land highways, civil protection initiatives to combat 
natural and man-made disasters, a Mediterranean solar energy plan, the inauguration of the Euro-Mediterranean University in Slovenia, and the 
Mediterranean Business Development Initiative focusing on micro, small and medium-sized enterprises.  
Action Plans during 2008 and 2009. Major economic reform efforts were recorded, although their 
future speed, sequence and depth are likely to be affected in the aftermath of the worldwide 
financial and economic crisis. Some countries advanced trade negotiations, tax and customs 
reform and competition policy, and kept introducing reforms conducive to improving the business 
environment. However, as the crisis spread to the real economy, the economic outlook of these 
economies has significantly changed.  
 
The outline of this chapter is as follows. Section 2 briefly presents the Euro-Mediterranean 
framework. Section 3 provides an overview of recent macro-economic developments in MED 
countries. Section 4 then gives a bird’s view of the recent financial and monetary developments, 
with a focus on the volatility at the stock and exchange rate markets because of the crisis, the 
turning points in commodity price developments, cross border bank loans and other financial 
exposure across geographical borders. Thereafter, chapter 5 discusses the progress in trade 
openness of the Mediterranean countries. Chapter 6 stresses the need for good governance and 
solid institution building. Section 7 assesses the economic assistance to ENP Mediterranean 
countries and, finally, section 8 concludes with a set of recommendations applicable regionwide. 
 
 
2. Tackling economic and financial challenges. An evolving EU architecture  
 
At the time the EU crafted the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) economic and financial 
affairs with the Mediterranean Partner Countries (MPCs) were institutionally addressed by 
devoting  one of its three foundation pillars  exclusively to economic relations. The objective was 
to improve the living conditions by accelerating socio-economic development, creating jobs and 
raising economic wealth in the Mediterranean region. Economic integration in the world economy 
was the motto and this was to be achieved through the establishment of a Euro-Mediterranean 
Free Trade Area by 2010. 
 
Trade integration in the global economy and the conclusion of bilateral FTAs with Mediterranean 
partners was the strategy to increase South Mediterranean GDP and stimulate job creation. By 
November 2008, all MPCs had signed and ratified FTAs with the EU and overall trade exchange 
between the MPCs and the EU had significantly increased, although scores were less impressive 
in terms of intra-regional trade exchanges among MPCs (see section 5 on trade developments 
and in particular graph 6). Intra-regional trade remained minor (just 8% of their total trade) and 
agreements suffered from reticence of the signing countries.  
 
Trade talks under the EMP focused on industrial goods liberalisation. Negotiations over the past 
decade resulted in tariff-free access for all MPCs manufactured products to the EU market. The 
EU accepted asymmetric transition periods implying that total tariffs dismantling for EU products 
would proceed over twelve years, delaying the date for a genuine FTA with MPCs at least until 
2015. More modest progress was achieved in liberalising agricultural products, agriculture being 
a very sensitive issue at both rims of the Mediterranean. Although agreements were signed with 
some MPCs, the scope for agricultural liberalisation still remains limited, allowing for large 
exception lists, quantitative restrictions and a broad spectrum of non-tariff barriers.  
 
By its nature, the EMP was established to become a coordinating body for macroeconomic policy 
responses to challenges in the region. However, by choosing to promote economic integration 
through trade liberalisation, macroeconomic aspects were relegated. At the time, the economic 
theory believed in the assumption that GDP growth, economic convergence and job creation 
would naturally follow deeper trade integration. Macroeconomic aspects gained more attention 
when these results did not fully materialise. 
 
In 2004, the EU adopted its European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) covering the circle of 
countries at its Eastern and Southern borders. For the MPCs, the ENP came to complement the 
regional approach promoted by the EMP. Action Plans were bilaterally signed between the EU 
and the majority of MPCs, including a substantial economic and financial chapter that was meant 
to become a road map for macroeconomic reforms in the next five years. Action Plans provided 
space for differentiated national ambitions, allowing countries to proceed at their own pace in 
economic and financial reforms. Quality rather than quantity targets were established and 
deadlines avoided.  
 
The ENP promoted the discussion of macroeconomic issues at the bilateral level by introducing 
several sub-chapters related to fiscal policies, public finance management, monetary policies and 
labour market reforms in Action Plans. Since then, macroeconomic policy coordination has also 
been promoted at the multilateral level. In 2007, the European Commission launched the Euro-
Mediterranean network of public finance experts, whose objective was to bring together national 
experts on public finance management in order to share lessons learned in the reform process 
and exploit synergies within the region. However, the multilateral approach to macroeconomic 
coordination in the Mediterranean region remains secondary to the efforts deployed on the 
bilateral basis. 
 
Contrary to what many critics of the EMP process argue, we think that cooperation on economic 
and financial issues has delivered some positive results. The EMP has been a platform for 
negotiating central economic issues, particularly the ones linked to the process of trade 
liberalisation; and under the ENP, the majority of MPCs have been implementing macroeconomic 
reforms which have already produced significant results in terms of improved economic stability in 
the region. Steady average growth rates of around 5%, contained inflation, reduced and/or 
contained public deficits and better management of public debts, are all positive outcomes linked 
to reforms. Past and current reform efforts are thus paying off.  
 
In the next section we will present the major recent economic developments in MPCs, putting 
them into a longer perspective, so economic trends can be established on the basis of the data 
gathered over the last four years. It will follow that in many MPCs almost all macroeconomic 
variables have been evolving rather positively , including unemployment and inflation, and have 
helped these countries to stay put in their efforts to weather the global storm. 
 
 
 
3. Macroeconomic developments 
 
The sharp drop in world trade that started at the end of 2008 was not immediately felt in the 
Mediterranean region. The MED countries kept their imports from abroad at the same level as 
before, but started feeling the pinch of the strong drop in demand for their goods from the 
developing countries a little later (see Graph 1). MED countries' falling exports  were paramount 
in slowing down the domestic economic activity. However, the  extent to which the different MED 
countries took measures to avoid or to anticipate the slowdown of their economic activity differed 
widely. This section analyzes the immediate impact of shrinking trade volumes on the real sectors 
of the economy across the MED countries.4 
 
Graph 1: Global world trade versus MENA region trade 
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Real GDP growth: MED countries have been growing steadily at an average rate close to 5% 
until the global crisis hit the world at the end of 2007. Although recession widely spread among 
developed economies, in 2008 MED economies grew at an average of 5.4% and managed to 
keep positive growth rates in 2009, reaching a regional growth average of 3.4% (graph 2).. The 
low exposure of their financial markets to financial turbulences and their low integration in the 
international economy helped them to cushion the impacts of the shock 5. Growth rates, although 
positive, were nonetheless inferior to those in 2008, particularly in Egypt, Tunisia, and Israel. 
Economic growth in oil-exporting countries was largely driven by hydrocarbon revenues and the 
boost to private sector investment financed by FDI inflows from neighbouring Arab countries. Oil-
importing countries also registered impressive growth rates reflecting growth in non traditional 
sectors, abundance of liquidity and strong domestic demand.  
 
 
 
                                                 
4 For details on policies and macroeconomic indicators, see also the chapter on the Mediterranean region in the Impact of the Impact of the  
Global Crisis on Neighbouring Countries of the EU, Occasional Papers No 48, May 2009, European Commission, at 
 http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/publication_summary15400_en.htm 
5 Within the Med region Israel has always been an exception in that its financial and banking system proved relatively robust despite its high 
integration with the global economy, free capital mobility and the extensive international trade and financial flows. Notwithstanding some stress in 
the lending rates and the equity and corporate markets, the functioning of the financial system was not severely impaired. This is the result of the 
prudent banking practices, the increased transparency and the longstanding implicit government guarantees that anchored confidence. 
 
 
 
 
 
Graph 2: GDP growth in 2009 in comparison with the average during last years 
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The situation of these economies however radically weakened as the global economic and 
financial crisis spread to the real economy, as follows from leading indicators (Graph 3). Basically 
all the main drivers of economic growth in the region showed the first signs of weakness: oil 
revenues quickly contracted in oil-exporting countries, FDI from the Gulf countries fell, and the 
European demand took a serious hit with several EU countries already in recession. Most MED 
countries needed to rely more upon domestic demand to be able to sustain growth in 2009. In the 
case of Syria and Jordan, a positive stimulus was derived from fast-rising import demand from 
neighbouring Iraq, which is undergoing a rapid reconstruction. All countries in the region faced 
lower growth in 2009, although the reasons vary. Oil exporters got hit quickly; plummeting oil 
prices reduced government revenues drastically, held back ambitious infrastructure plans, and 
greatly reduced growth projections; trade surpluses contracted, limiting the future ability of these 
governments to cope with social challenges and unemployment. Oil importers (Tunisia, Jordan, 
and Morocco) welcomed cheaper oil; trade deficits narrowed and pressure on budgets eased 
since governments employed fewer resources to finance oil subsidies; however, trade 
dependence on economies in recession also brought about a contraction in growth.  
 
Unemployment rates: The MED region has the highest, albeit decreasing, levels of labour force 
growth (3.4% per year: 2000-2005, 3.0% per year: 2005-2010) than any other region in the world, 
except sub-Saharan Africa. Labour force growth remains high, increasing the pressure for job 
creation. Consistently high average growth rates have been translated into falling average 
unemployment rates (2004: 13.8%, 2008: 11.9%6), narrowing the gap with other developing 
regions. However,  unemployment rates remain persistently high at rates equal or above 9% in all 
MEDs (excluding Israel). The employment gains made during 2008 were lost in 2009 due to the 
shrinking growth rates in the region , the economic recession in most European countries, and 
                                                 
6 These figures exclude Libya, for which unemployment rates are only available for 2007. 
the depressed growth in the Gulf countries which traditionally absorbed a large part of MED 
countries' migration. 
 
Budgetary position: Overall, the average general government budget  has been contracting 
steadily for the last four years. MED countries abandoned an average surplus close to 0.3% of 
GDP in 2008 to plunge to an average budget deficit neighbouring 5% in 2009.  
Graph 3: Short term indicators of GDP-growth 
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Most countries in the region have experienced a weakening in their budgetary positions. In oil-
exporting countries fiscal positions remained solid (+9% in Algeria and +24.6% in Libya), in 2008 
owing to buoyant oil export revenues. Among oil-importing countries, budget balances improved 
marginally mainly as a result of better fiscal revenue performances. This was the case in 
Morocco, which registered a small surplus (0.1% in 2008), and in Tunisia, which managed to 
reduce its budget deficit thanks to mounting efficiency in tax and customs administration. 
Subsidies continued to substantially impact on public finances in 2008 in some MED countries, 
with direct food and oil subsidies accounting for an estimated 4% of GDP in Tunisia, 5% in 
Morocco, and 9% in Egypt. 
 
However, budget balances deteriorated in all MED countries in 2009. The average budget deficit 
dropped to 4.6% from a surplus of 0.3% in 2008. Oil-exporter Algeria registered budget deficits 
for the first time in a long period, while for the rest of the countries the current budget deficits are 
likely to deepen in variable intensity (from slight changes in Egypt to more pronounced 
deteriorations such in the case of Morocco, Jordan and Syria). Gloomy forecasts for budget 
deficits are the result of declining oil prices combined with the first fiscal responses of some MED 
economies to the crisis.  
 
MED countries responded to the first impact of the global crisis by putting in place fiscal stimulus 
packages geared toward job-creating infrastructure investment (Egypt, Jordan and Morocco), 
supporting domestic SMEs and employment (Tunisia) and reactivating the sectors affected by the 
crisis. Although the timeliness of these measures can hardly be contested, there is always the 
risk that fiscal expansions might have negative repercussions in the medium run from a further 
widening of fiscal deficits.  
Graph 4: Fiscal revenues and expenditures and exports and imports of goods 
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Lower oil prices have made it possible for oil-importing MED countries to embark on fiscal 
expansions, although these have been variable in size: Egypt, Morocco and Jordan and Israel. 
Some MED countries are better prepared than others to stave off the crisis. In Morocco, years of 
fiscal reforms efforts have contributed to create the necessary fiscal space to respond to external 
shocks without incurring in huge public deficits. In contrast, the announced fiscal expansion will 
further widen the fiscal deficits in some countries (Jordan), therefore increasing budget pressures 
and the weight of the public debt. 
 
It is difficult to judge whether recent policy measures are commensurate with the scale of the 
problem. Most MED countries have announced that fiscal measures will be temporary in nature 
but have let the window open for extensions. In the short-run, the scope for counter-cyclical fiscal 
policy will be determined by several factors such as MED countries' appetite for external financing 
through international borrowing, the expected volume of privatization revenues, and their current 
levels of debt. In the current context of scarce liquidity in international markets, borrowing may be 
an expensive option, and privatization revenues will drop as foreign investors behave 
conservatively and delay buying decisions. Naturally, the main oil exporters will have a bigger 
margin of manoeuvre to enhance the scope of the fiscal response, but they should closely 
monitor the speed at which foreign reserves might get depleted, particularly given the extent of 
decline in foreign demand.  
 
In the long-run, MED economies would need to reduce the dependence on a few commodity 
exports by diversifying the productive fabric. This would require massive public investments in 
infrastructure, education, health and renewable energy sources (solar and wind). The fact that 
most MED countries are sticking to announced public investment programs should be welcomed. 
 
 
 
 
Graph 5: Current account in 2009 in comparison with previous years 
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Improved fiscal balances helped reduce the burden of public debt in all MED countries in 2008. 
The regional gross public debt average stood at 57.3% of GDP in 2008, steadily declining since 
2004 (80%). In 2009 it increased slightly to 60.6%. Country analysis reveals that debt-to-GDP 
ratios have been reduced across the region. Oil exporters have used oil revenues to repay the 
debt and oil importers have managed to reduce the debt burden by lowering their public deficits. 
However, the countries showing high levels of debt (Egypt, Israel, Jordan and Lebanon) will face 
mounting difficulties to keep reducing the debt stock. Indeed, the privatization revenues that 
helped to keep public deficits on check contracted at the light of the break on privatization 
processes brought about by the current international credit crunch.  
 
However, the situation changed in 2009, with government revenues falling  sharply in most MED 
countries and government expenditures soaring (see Graph 4). On average, revenues in the 
MED countries fell by 4 percentage points, from 35% of GDP in 2008 to 31% in 2009. 
Expenditures rose from 34% of GDP in 2008 to 40% of GDP in 2009.  Consequently, budget 
balances deteriorated. The absence of strong automatic stabilizers may entail that these fiscal 
developments have medium to long-term repercussions, among others on economic growth.  
 
 
Current account: Excluding Libya from regional averages, the region continues to display a 
negative average current account balance. The high volatility of oil and commodity prices has 
greatly affected trade balances, resulting in a substantial deterioration of the current account 
balances in all MED countries in 2008 (excluding  Libya and Jordan)7. Country analysis reveals 
that in Algeria it has heavily contracted to from 19.6% of GDP to 3.2% of GDP over the 2008-09 
                                                 
7 Oil is becoming an economic asset in a growing number of economies in the region (in Egypt and Tunisia oil represents 20% and 15% of total 
export revenues in 2008, respectively).  
period in 2009. In Libya the current account surplus also plummeted from 40.7% to 16.8% of 
GDP over the same period. In oil-importing countries, the combination of growing imports (fuelled 
 by high oil prices and strong domestic demand) and declining exports (as the external demand 
from main trade partners –the EU and the USA- started to contract) explains the substantial 
weakening of current account balances, particularly in Jordan, Lebanon and Morocco, indicating 
how sensitive these countries are to oil price movements and how dependent they are on a small 
number of trade partners. 
MED countries have traditionally financed large trade deficits by using tourism and remittances 
revenues.8 In 2008, total gross remittances inflows for Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan, Tunisia and 
Morocco reached USD27 billion, three times as much as in 2000. However, the slowdown in 
European economic growth is already weakening both sources of revenue: the potential earnings 
of emigrants and their ability to remit wages to their home countries, and the tourism sector, a 
vital job creator and economic driver in Egypt, Tunisia and Morocco which greatly rely in 
European demand9. In Morocco, tourism revenues and remittances have declined in 2008 by 
3.5% and 2.4%, respectively. This was also the case in Lebanon, with remittances markedly 
decreasing as labour demand in the Gulf region contracted. In Jordan, remittances decreased by 
6% during the last quarter of 2008, although they increased at an annual basis. These negative 
developments intensified in 2009.  
 
From the previous section, it follows that the MED countries are and will be under strain due to 
the global crisis. And although the financial sector of the developed economies was the eye of the 
hurricane, the developing economies are hurt at first more in the real sector. But, in return, there 
might be negative spillovers from their real to their financial sectors. Monitoring of the financial 
developments is thus crucial for policy makers in order to conduct the policies timely and 
adequately.   
 
Although far less developed than the developing countries, most MED countries have developed 
stock markets going up to more than 100% of GDP in market capitalization. Most financially 
integrated in the developed economies in this respect is Israel. In order to measure investors’ 
uncertainty, Box 1 compares the strong movements in the stock markets and the high volatility 
across the MED countries.  
 
                                                 
8 The Med region has received the largest amount of worker's remittances relative to its GDP in the world during 1996-2006. 
9 Jordan is an exception. Tourism revenues are holding up (+6% in 2008 accounting for 8% of GDP). 
4. Financial and monetary developments 
 
Since the start of the global financial turmoil in July 2007, until their peak in the period July 2007- 
July 2009, the Jordanian stock market increased by 94% (see table in Box 1), and also Egypt’s by 
65% and the Lebanese stock market by 79% still gained significantly. Since this date, until June 
2009, stock markets in the EU and the US dropped continuously, up to 60% and 53% 
respectively. Both, the stock markets in Egypt and Israel, lost similarly. Where Israel due to its 
high degree of financial integration moved in line with the EU and US, Egypt coupled far later with 
the negative trend that started in July 2007.10 From peak to through, also Jordan, Lebanon, 
Morocco and Tunisia lost tremendously.  
 
Higher volatility in the markets, caused by the global financial and economic crisis, follows from 
the moving standard deviations of the share price indices (see graphs in Box 1). Egypt, Jordan 
and Israel rank highest in terms of the increase in volatility. In the period January 2007 until June 
2009 the Israeli volatility peaked in December 2008, like the volatility at the stock markets in the 
EU and the US. Investors’ uncertainty in Egypt remained relatively constant, until March 2009. 
This development aligns with the developments in the real sector in Egypt.  The increase in 
volatility in the share prices of the stock markets of Lebanon, Morocco and Tunisia was more 
muted, due to the relatively lower degree of financial development and integration.  In sum, stock 
markets tumbled drastically in the MED-region where some stock markets show a high degree of 
investors’ uncertainty though some months later than in the developed economies.  
 
A relevant factor at play when discussing (cross-border) investors’ behaviour is the role of the 
exchange rate.  On top of the volatility of shares, there is the volatility of the exchange rate for 
those investors that own foreign currencies. These investors run the double risk, as they first 
have to exchange their own currency for the currency of the country where they want to make 
their investments (currency risk) and thereafter the risk of the investment. As Jordan and 
Lebanon have a fixed peg at the dollar, their stock markets may be safer for institutional or other 
investors that trade in US dollars. The extent, to which exchange rate volatility plays a role for 
investors, depends however on many more factors.  
 
From Box 2 follows that in the period January 2007 until June 2009 the domestic currency of 
Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria vis-à-vis euro recorded maximum jumps in one week 
of around 10%, reflecting a depreciation of 10%. The biggest drops was, e.g. for Egypt, 6.8% 
which reflects an appreciation of the Egyptian pound vis-à-vis the euro. This reflects that 
currencies depreciated sometimes strongly and rather quickly. Apart from Morocco and Tunisia, 
that pursue monetary policy of a basket in which the euro dominates, the weekly depreciations 
and appreciations of the domestic currencies of the MED countries were smaller vis-à-vis the US 
dollar. By and large, a similar reasoning holds for the peaks and troughs of the daily changes in 
the bilateral exchange rates with the euro and US dollar.  
 
The development of the volatility in the exchange rate markets during the financial crisis (up until 
June 2009) is visualized in the graphs in Box 2. The peak of the volatility is clearly in 2009, for all 
countries. This holds for both, the bilateral exchange rates with the euro as well as with the US 
dollar. On a positive note, the volatility starts decreasing at the end of the period under 
investigation here, which may indicate that the financial situation is getting better.  
                                                 
10 For details, see the country chapters in the Impact of the Impact of the  Global Crisis on Neighbouring Countries of the EU, Occasional Papers 
No 48, May 2009, European Commission, at 
 http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/publication_summary15400_en.htm 
 
Box 1  Stock market volatility during the global financial crisis 
 
 
Developments in share prices during 16 July 2007 and 24 June 2009
in domestic currency
Egypt Israel Jordan Lebanon Morocco Tunisia EU U
Share price index CASE 30 Tel Aviv 100 Amman BLOM Casablanca 25 Tunis Euronext 100 Dow 
Peak (% change 24 June 2009 since 16 July 2007) 65 3 94 79 28 27 0
Trough (% change 24 June 2009 since 16 July 2007) -53 -52 -6 -12 -18 -3 -60
Maximum change (day-on-day, in %) 9.3 7.2 7.8 8.9 4.6 3.8 10.9
Minimum change (day-on-day, in %) -16.5 -10.0 -7.9 -6.6 -4.5 -4.6 -8.6
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The rather developed stock markets of Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia became 
gradually more volatile as the global financial crisis intensified and translated in a global 
economic crisis at the end of 2008. The most financially integrated country in the MENA-region – 
Israel – mimicked the stock markets developments in the euro area and the US (see the 
synchronicity of the green line in first graph and yellow and grey lines in third graph). Other 
countries, like Egypt, but also Jordan and Lebanon, reached its peak in stock market volatility 
later, in the course of 2009.   
 
 
Box 2  Exchange rate volatility during the global financial crisis 
 
Developments in exchange rates during 1 January 2007 and 24 June 2009
Algeria Egypt Israel Jordan Lebanon Libya Morocco Syria Tunisia
domestic exchange rate vis-à-vis the EUR
Maximum change (day-on-day, in %) 3.6 3.9 4.5 3.9 3.8 4.2 1.2 3.8 1.5
Minimum change (day-on-day, in %) -7.0 -2.9 -3.2 -2.7 -2.7 -4.5 -1.5 -10.8 -1.3
Maximum change (week-on-week, in %) 11.8 10.5 6.0 10.7 10.7 7.6 1.8 10.6 2.8
Minimum change (week-on-week, in %) -4.9 -6.8 -5.2 -6.5 -6.5 -5.6 -2.7 -13.5 -2.2
domestic exchange rate vis-à-vis the USD
Maximum change (day-on-day, in %) 3.1 1.2 4.2 0.5 0.8 2.5 3.4 0.1 2.2
Minimum change (day-on-day, in %) -2.6 -0.9 -2.7 -0.2 -1.0 -3.2 -2.8 -9.7 -2.5
Maximum change (week-on-week, in %) 5.1 1.7 5.5 0.4 1.0 3.3 5.6 0.1 5.6
Minimum change (week-on-week, in %) -3.2 -1.4 -5.7 -6.6 -0.5 -3.3 -8.3 -9.7 -7.0
Note: A positive (negative) sign indicates a depreciation (appreciation) of the domestic currency.
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Exchange rate volatility significantly increased from 2007 to 2008, and even doubled or tripled in 
2009 in comparison with 2008. This holds for the bilateral exchange rate with the euro (see left 
graphs) as well as for the bilateral exchange rate with the US dollar (right graphs).   
NB:  Exceptions are the dollar exchange rate of Jordan and Lebanon as these are fixed pegs.  
 
 
While the volatility of the stock markets reflects an increasing uncertainty by investors which 
could lead to a further slowdown in economic activity, government policies of stimulus packages 
and loosening monetary policy will be conducive to boost economic activity and reduce 
uncertainty. This can in return stabilize stock market investments. 
 
Although the volatility of a domestic currency can hamper financial investments, and via this 
channel also investment opportunities of businesses that attract funds from the stock exchange, 
flexible currency regimes can be helpful from the macroeconomic perspective in several respects. 
For instance, price stability is for most countries more easily within reach under flexible exchange 
rate regimes. More volatility in exchange rates is therefore not to be associated with bad 
developments or bad policies, but an increase in volatility over time is ceteris paribus evidently a 
sign of more movements and thus uncertainty in the markets. 
 
One positive externality of the latest developments is that the global crisis has decelerated the 
trend of soaring consumer prices. High oil and food prices had been pushing up inflation in the 
commodity importing countries, such as in Egypt, Jordan and the occupied Palestinian territory, 
but also in the other MED countries that face a relatively lower level of inflation. In August 2008 
CPI-inflation reached almost 24% in Egypt and in September 2008 18.5% in Jordan (year-over-
year).   
 
In the wake of the global crisis, lower world demand for commodities has brought commodity 
price inflation significantly down (see Box 3), and this decline has been transmitted in domestic 
prices in the MED countries. Although in comparison with peer economies still at a high level, 
CPI-inflation in Egypt came down by more than 10 percentage points from its peak (to 10% in 
May 2009). Also inflation in Israel and Tunisia more than halved.  
 
The lower inflation increases purchasing power for households and businesses, which would 
normally lead to growth of demand for products and services and thus stimulate economic 
activity. But, in Jordan and Morocco the declining trend in inflation has been so steep that these 
economies run the risk of getting into a deflationary spiral. This is not conducive for economic 
growth as consumers spending might be delayed with a view to the lower price opportunities in 
the future.  
 
Further easing of fiscal or monetary conditions may be needed to avoid this downward spiralling 
trend of lower consumer spending which contributes negatively to economic activity, which lowers 
prices and which in turn leads to lower consumer spending. Contrasting these developments is 
the rising inflation in Algeria (see green line in Box 3), as the lower global food prices have so far 
not been transmitted into the domestic prices.   
 
While some MED countries have already implemented fiscal stimulus packages to boost 
economic activity, also the monetary authorities started easing monetary policy. In sharp contrast 
with the soaring price developments in the years 2007 and 2008, monetary policy rates could be 
reduced as inflation rates were coming down which was the right conduct of monetary policy in 
the time of slowing or even stagnating economic activity.  
 
However, global food inflation has stopped its decreasing trend (see graph in Box 3). In case this 
trend continues, which becomes very likely should the economies of the developed economies 
grow again within a couple of quarters, the MED countries may again become trapped in the 
situation of a high inflation that is hard to combat. For this reason, measures to increase product 
market flexibility and unblock downward price rigidities would be welcomed.   
 
Box 3  Developments in commodity and consumer price inflation during the financial crisis 
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Although some of the emerging and developing economies in the region have seemingly been 
less affected by the global crisis because of their less deep and less integrated financial systems 
these economies are in other respects more vulnerable to shocks. By and large, their public debt 
is high and their financial buffers are low11. In this context it is fair to distinguish between the oil-
exporting MED countries, Algeria and Libya, and the oil-importing MED countries. Financial and 
economic exposure indicators visualize the sharp contrasts between these two country groups 
(lower part of Box 4). Algeria and Libya have accumulated significant foreign exchange reserves 
thanks to their abundant production and exports of hydrocarbons. On average their reserves 
stand at more than 100% of their GDP. The existence of these reserves guarantees stability, e.g. 
for intervening in the money markets in case of sharp exchange rate depreciations of the 
domestic currency. By contrast, the average foreign exchange rate reserves to GDP ratio of the 
other MED countries is only 20%.  
 
Related to this comfortable reserve position are favourable trade surpluses and external debt 
positions of the oil-exporting countries. On the contrary,  the oil-importing countries run trade 
deficits, which have to be compensated by tourism income, remittances and FDIs in order to 
show a minor positive balance of payments. Algeria and Libya have been able to pay off their 
external debt, resulting in average external debt-to-GDP ratio down to 10%.  
 
Financial development and integration are uneven between oil-importers and oil-exporters, but 
less so than in the case of trade balances and external debt.. Algeria has no stock market, and 
Libya only just started one, while companies in Egypt, Jordan and Lebanon and to a lesser 
degree in Morocco, Tunisia and the occupied Palestinian territory have contributed to the private 
sector development by investing the funds they obtained via their domestic stock markets. Also, 
the companies and households in these latter countries have been able to make more ample use 
of bank loans. The loan-to-deposit ratio in the oil-importing countries is almost twice the ratio in 
the oil-exporting countries in the MED region. 
 
Bank loans from domestic and foreign banks to the non-banking sector increased during the last 
years in Egypt, Israel, Lebanon and Morocco, among others (see graphs in upper part of Box 4). 
In Lebanon these amounted even up to 15% of GDP in 2008. The lack of liquidity in the 
international banking sector stopped this upward trend, temporarily.    
                                                 
11 For details, see the country chapters in the Impact of the Global Crisis on Neighbouring Countries of the EU, Occasional Papers No 48, May 
2009, European Commission, at 
 http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/publication_summary15400_en.htm 
 
Box 4  Cross border bank loans during the financial crisis and other financial indicators 
 
Bank loans to the non-banking sector (from BIS-reporting banks) decreased sharply in Egypt, 
Israel, Lebanon and Morocco at the end of 2008. 
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countries have trade deficits, relatively low foreign exchange reserves and relatively high external 
debt while they receive modest income from tourism, net remittances and net FDI. Positively, 
their private sector obtains a reasonable amount of loans from banks (which follows from the 
relatively high loan to deposit ratio) and attracts a reasonable amount of funds via the stock 
exchange (see stock market capitalization). These funds are conducive to for economic growth 
and job creation.  
5.  Trade liberalisation and economic opening 
 
Trade flows have been among the first macroeconomic indicators that signalled the affection by 
the crisis. World trade volume grew by 4.4% in 2008 at nearly half of the average annual growth 
of 8.6% over the period 2004-2007. Data for 2009 points to a strong decline in world import 
volumes (-10%), a situation that can be aggravated as recession spreads among advanced 
economies.  
 
While the global contracting demand would affect all categories of MED countries alike, the costs 
of falling trade are getting unevenly distributed across the MED region. As export revenues 
declined among the MED economies' main trade partners (EU and the US), their imports followed 
suit, therefore affecting the growth prospects of the countries that are more EU trade dependent, 
such as Morocco, Tunisia, Libya and Algeria. In countries with a more diversified set of trade 
partners, the trade impact may not become as radical since import demand from emerging 
economies is still holding. Oil economies are also suffering from the dramatic fall in oil and 
primary commodity prices that intervened during the second half of 2008, with export revenues 
dropped sharply in 2009. 
 
Since trade is a crucial engine of growth in the MED region, countries have been reacting to 
declining trade flows. In Syria, the authorities have recently adopted a series of measures aimed 
at protecting the Syrian industry.12 In Egypt, the temporary export bans on rice and cement have 
been extended or re-established in 2009. Algeria is reconsidering the schedule for tariff 
dismantling that it agreed at the moment the Association Agreement was signed with the EU. 
Although these are rather isolated movements, their ability to spark a protectionist wave across 
the region cannot be underestimated. If other countries follow, the overall trend towards trade 
liberalization that has been observed during the last years could be compromised.  
 
During 2008, MED countries continued to implement the provisions of the Association 
Agreements, including the dismantling of tariffs on industrial products under the Free Trade 
Agreements (FTAs).13 Although trade liberalisation in goods will not be achieved with all partners 
by 2010, a critical mass of industrial and agricultural liberalisation will be completed by this date, 
while agreed dismantling schedules will continue to be implemented later on. Two countries, 
Tunisia and the occupied Palestinian territory, have a fully effective and implemented FTA with 
the EU. Trade tariff dismantling continues in other MED. 
                                                 
12 A total of 25 measures have been adopted in February 2009. They include reduction on fuel pries, reduction on the price of cement, the stop of 
the use of purchasing quotas, and the set of minimum prices for importing cloths (European Commission, DG TRADE). 
13 The EU concluded bilateral Association Agreements with all Med partners apart from Syria, but this is likely to be concluded in 2009.  
Graph 6: Exports of the MED countries to the EU, Africa, Middle East and other regions 
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The final objective of the EU is to establish a fully-fledged EuroMed regional FTA by 2010, 
implying an expansion of the coverage into other areas such as services and investment,  further 
liberalisation for (processed) agricultural and fisheries products, and the establishment of a 
dispute settlement mechanism. Bilateral negotiations on the liberalisation of services and the right 
of establishment have been launched so far with Egypt, Israel, Morocco and Tunisia but they 
make progress at a different pace. Negotiations on agricultural, processed agricultural and 
fisheries products have been concluded with Egypt Israel and Morocco continue with Tunisia. 
Discussions are on-going on negotiations in industrial standards and conformity assessment with 
the objective to negotiate Agreements on Conformity Assessment and Accreditation (ACAAs) 
with the aim to encourage industrial integration and give MED partners a stake in the internal 
market.  
 
In addition, MED countries have agreed to pursue efforts towards the opening of domestic 
markets beyond free trade in goods and services. In this optic, the establishment of deep and 
comprehensive free trade agreements (DFTAs) covering all trade in goods and services between 
the EU and its MED partners as well as strong legally-binding provisions on the implementation of 
trade and economic regulatory issues, will be negotiated between the EU and interested MED 
partners, such as Morocco, and potentially Tunisia and Egypt. Economic integration in the MED 
region has been nurtured by the conclusion of a network of FTA among Southern MED countries. 
The Agadir agreement, which aims at establishing a FTA between Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt and 
Jordan, entered into force in May 2007. Notwithstanding the existence of positive lists of products 
exempted from customs duties, the four countries accepted the principle of a full liberalisation of 
their trade of goods. Agadir is also endowed with the Pan EuroMed set of rules of origin, therefore 
providing for diagonal cumulation of origin between 41 trade partners. Its implementation was 
until recently hindered by certain national sensitivities concerning the trade of agricultural 
products or vehicles, but in July 2008 the Ministers of Trade reached an agreement concerning 
the trade of vehicles. Other countries having signed a FTA are Israel and Jordan. In addition, 
Egypt, Israel, Morocco, the occupied Palestinian territory, Syria and Tunisia have signed bilateral 
agreements with Turkey; however, these are limited in scope since they cover essentially trade in 
goods, which renders the liberalisation exercise incomplete, and limits their positive impact in 
terms of commercial exchanges and potential GDP growth. 
 
The commitment of MED countries towards deeper South-South economic integration needs to 
be pursued if the region wants to keep attracting Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) particularly in 
the traditional sectors boosting job creation. The MED region will face increased competition to 
attract FDI given that the current worldwide financial and economic crisis has halted international 
investment in 2008, with FDI flows declining by 22% from a historical record of USD1.8 trillion in 
2007. The fall in global FDI has been fuelled by two factors: a reduced capability of firms to invest 
due to limited access to financial resources, and a reduced propensity to invest due to grim 
economic prospects, particularly in developed countries that have been hit hard by economic 
recession (WEF, 2009).  
 
Although the crisis has not spared the MED region in terms of FDI, MED economies have stood 
firm so far despite a relative slowdown of inward FDI. In 2008 the region continued attracting 
close to 500 projects, but FDI inflows contracted by 6.5% (USD38 bn in 2008 down from USD41 
bn in 2007). Egypt and Algeria were the regional champions and attracted USD10.9 bn and 
USD7.6 bn, respectively, which in the case of Algeria is a major improvement in comparison to 
past years. In contrast, Israel and Tunisia experienced a sharp FDI slowdown (50% and 75%, 
respectively). When expressed as a share of GDP, Jordan and Lebanon recorded the highest net 
FDI in the region (11.8% and 24.7%, respectively). Lebanon maintained its position as favourite 
destination of total FDI from the Gulf countries over the 2002-08 period (no less than 30%), which 
has resulted in FDI-to-GDP ratios doubling over the last four years. In Egypt, although FDI 
volumes were resilient in 2008, FDI strongly contracted in 2009.14  
 
The combined effect of the global liquidity crisis and falling oil prices has been having a great 
impact in the Gulf countries, resulting in decreasing volumes of FDI directed to the MED region. 
Investments in the real estate sector, which have long been privileged by Gulf investors, halved in 
2008 amounting to just 19% of the total FDI for 2008.15 Productive investment has also been 
scaled down. The space left by Gulf countries in 2008 has been filled by European investors 
(mainly the UK, France, and the Netherlands) which occupy now the first position by issuing 41% 
of FDI inflows (compared with 17% originating in the Gulf economies). In addition, Europeans 
                                                 
14 Egypt financed over one hundred projects in 2008 (e.g. concession of the Ein Sokhna port, Red Sea, to UAE’s). 
15 Some projects have survived despite the credit shortage, such as Saudi Arabia’s Snasco project in Algeria, and Qatar’s Diar projects in Egypt 
but some others were just cancelled.  
invest in a wider range of sectors than Gulf investors, with energy absorbing 31% of FDI funds 
and 11% of the MED projects, followed by financial services (15%) and telecoms (11%).  
 
FDI is vital for the region. But current sectoral distribution of FDIs needs to be adjusted. Very 
often FDI is overly concentrated in large-scale real-state and tourist projects that provide little 
local added-value, do little to stimulate the utilization of domestic factors of production, and have 
great negative environmental impacts; moreover, this concentration is increasing year after year. 
For FDI to make a difference, MED countries need to intensify efforts to attract "quality FDI 
inflows" conducive to the strengthening and diversification of the industrial fabric according to 
national priorities, and to finance the large infrastructure needs that are still hampering the 
economic activity.16  
 
For the European industry, the MED region offers possibilities given the weak European domestic 
market situation. MED economies offer competitive production costs, represent new markets and 
have banking systems that have been relatively spared from the crisis. But for FDI to fully 
materialize, MED countries may want to reinforce efforts to improve the business environment 
and the attractiveness to foreign investors. The recent adoption of a new law of FDI in Algeria 
pushing foreign groups operating o its soil to re-invest locally part of the profits made, or Libya's 
threats about nationalising foreign oil companies may not be the right steps to attract further FDI 
to the region.  
                                                 
16 The potential number of jobs created per each million euro invested widely varies across economic sectors. It is highest for the electrical 
consumer goods (50), and automotive (41) and low for tourism (8) and very low for telecom (1) and energy (1).  
6.  Public institutions and governance systems 
 
The effect of the impact of the efficiency of public institutions and quality of governance on a 
country's overall socioeconomic development and its competitiveness in the global economy 
should not be underestimated. Next to this, many other factors play a role. Despite advances in 
several key areas of the economic reform agenda under the ENP, such as trade negotiations, tax 
and customs reform, and improvements in the business environment, there has been a notable 
standstill in democratic reforms and human rights standards. The recent communication from the 
European Commission on the implementation of the ENP emphasizes the overall lack of progress 
on governance issues in the MED region in 2008 (see European Commission, 2010).  
 
Low commitment to political reform was observed in Egypt. Despite significant progress in 
safeguarding women's and children's rights and in promoting access to primary education and 
healthcare, much remains to be done in the area of human rights and fundamental freedoms. 
Jordan made progress in penitentiary reform, transparency and the fight against corruption, but 
no significant advances were noted as regards the independence of the judiciary and the freedom 
of association. In Lebanon, progress in the fields of human rights, judicial reform, social sector 
reform, and administrative reform has also been slow. Several reforms could not be enacted as a 
result of a long political stalemate and legislative blockage. On the other hand, Morocco's and 
Tunisia's efforts in the area of social policy have produced satisfactory results in terms of health 
care, schooling, poverty alleviation and the protection of women's rights. The dialogue with the 
EU intensified on the fight against terrorism and organised crime. However, persistent 
deficiencies in the functioning of the judiciary constitute a risk for reforms, and the rule of law has 
to be strengthened in both countries. Freedom of association and expression, and freedom of the 
press are yet to be made a reality. 
 
According to the Global Competitiveness Report (UNCTAD, 2009) inefficiency of government 
bureaucracy is consistently cited by entrepreneurs as hampering business environment in the 
MED countries. Corruption is also mentioned among the five most problematic factors for 
businesses in Morocco, Syria, Algeria and Libya. Inadequately educated workforce (Egypt, 
Jordan, Syria, and Libya) and inadequate supply of infrastructure (Syria, Libya, Morocco and 
Israel) present yet another challenge to the national policy makers.  
According to the Global Competitiveness Index (GCI)17 governance of a country is assessed by 
information factors such as the trust of the public in public institutions, the judicial independence, 
the efficiency of the legal framework, transparency and the strength of auditing and reporting 
standards (see graph 7 for an illustration).18 Of all MED countries, Tunisia, Jordan and Israel are 
perceived to have the more efficient institutions. 
 
Tunisia, ranking 36th on overall GCI, institutions are one of the country's major competitive 
advantages (22nd), with the high public trust of politicians (16th), transparent policies (15th) and a 
favourably assessed efficiency of government spending (2nd). Jordanian institutions are also 
assessed rather positively (27th), with transparency of government policymaking somewhat  
 
                                                 
17  GCI measures the overall competitiveness of a nation on over 100 indicators grouped into 12 pillars covering areas such as institutions, 
macroeconomic stability, health and education, labour and financial markets as well as issues related to inequality, gender bias, mobile phone 
and internet subscribers. The rankings are based on the Executive Opinion Survey (EOS) completed by top management business leaders 
around the world. GCI 2008-2009 is available for 134 countries, and for all but Lebanon and the oPt in the MED region (see Schwab and 
Porter, 2009). 
18  As these are limited measures of governance and because of a strong business bias (reflected in the questions of and the 
respondents to the underlying survey, EOS), the GCI should be used cautiously as a governance indicator. 
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lagging behind (49th).19 In Israel20, public institutions have received a more critical assessment, 
with increasing concerns about inefficient government spending (60th) and a deteriorating public 
trust in politicians (61st).  
 
Egypt and Syria rank higher on institutions overall (52nd and 54th respectively), but Morocco (61st) 
receives a better assessment on favouritism in decisions by government officials, efficiency of 
government spending, burden of regulation. Transparency of government policymaking is flawed 
in Syria (106th), Libya (100th) and Algeria (112th). In the latter, it is also coupled with a low public 
trust of politicians (the region's lowest 72nd), suggesting the relations between the government 
and the civil society need to be enhanced. In Egypt, Syria, Libya and Algeria, the quality of 
education and efficiency of goods, labour and financial markets remain weak, hampering their 
socioeconomic development. Upgrading its institutional environment should be one of the top 
priorities of Algeria.  
 
                                                 
19 Jordan's GCI (48th) is influenced by the country's weak and deteriorating macroeconomic position due to a growing budget deficit and resultant 
debt level (111th). 
20 Israel's GCI, high at 23rd, and the MED highest, is largely due to outstanding performance on innovation (6th) and business sophistication (23rd).  
Many countries in the region have strengthened the legal and institutional framework for 
combating corruption, which in some cases proved instrumental to radically improve the business 
environment. All but Syria have ratified the UN Convention against Corruption (UNCAC).21 Some 
have national anti-corruption laws. Jordan, a leader in efforts to promote the implementation of 
UNCAC, tops the ranking of the Arab MED countries based on the 2008 Corruption Perception 
Index, improving its score from 4.7 to 5.1 since the previous assessment.22 The 2008 CPI shows 
lower perceived levels of corruption in Algeria (3.2), Libya (2.6) and Tunisia (4.4). For Lebanon 
(3.0) and Morocco (3.5), the CPI remained unchanged. Perception of corruption worsened for 
Egypt (2.8), Israel (6.0), and Syria (2.1). 
 
7. Is EU´s assistance to MPCs commensurate with their economic challenges? 
 
The EU has invested vast sums of financial and human resources into responding to the 
challenges facing the MPCs. The MEDA II Regulation was the main EU financial instrument of 
the EMP during the 2000-06 period and the EU made over €5 billion available for its support. This 
amount was complemented by Member States’ support to MPCs with a contribution of €10 billion 
over the same period. The vast majority of MEDA II financial resources (40%) was devoted to 
supporting economic reforms, including trade and private sector development, outpacing the 
amount devoted to infrastructure (21%) and to social sector (19%). The objective was to develop 
and strengthen competitive MPC economies and to integrate them into the world economy. A 
variety of instruments were used: budget support to promote and accompany systematic reforms, 
technical assistance programmes, and twinning to strengthen institutional capacity. These efforts 
have produced positive results. A recent evaluation assessed the impact of the MEDA II program 
on the socio-economic objectives as stated in the second pillar of the Barcelona Process and 
concluded that many positive developments have been observed in MPCs in terms of increased 
economic stability, competitiveness and trade (European Commission, May 2010). 
 
The EC’s interventions: i) helped MPCs to better formulate and implement the reforms agreed in 
the economic road map. The quality and the continuity of the EU-MPCs economic dialogue 
increased the ownership perception and produced more sustainable results. ii) supported 
comprehensive structural and sector reforms rather than specific sets of activities by transiting 
from project support to budget support; and iii) managed to stimulate trade opening and trade 
liberalisation, and contributed to improve the business environment and the competitiveness. It 
worked better when the EU aligned its interventions with other multilateral institutions, increasing 
the political credibility and backup of reforms. 
 
EC´s support for economic reforms, notably with intensive recourse to budget support in the 
countries where it was possible, has effectively promoted changes in MPCs, and there is ample 
evidence supporting this statement in the past section devoted to recent economic developments. 
Several countries have improved the sustainability of their public finance and the resilience of 
their macro-financial aggregates to external shocks as a result of the implementation of economic 
reform programmes supported by international donors, including the European Commission. 
                                                 
21  Recent ratifications took place in Tunisia (September 2008), Israel and Lebanon (February and April 2009 respectively). Syria signed UNCAC in 
December 2003. 
22 The 2008 Corruption Perception Index produced annually by Transparency International looks at perceptions of public sector corruption in 180 
countries and is a composite index that draws on 13 polls and surveys from 11 independent institutions. Countries are ranged on a scale from zero 
(high levels of perceived corruption) to ten (low levels of perceived corruption). The occupied Palestinian territory is not included in the assessment 
due to lack of data. 
However, the convergence of living standards, the increase of exports from the MPCs to the EU, 
and the intensification of intra-regional trade that would be necessary to reach the objective of 
shared prosperity have not taken place at the expected pace, notwithstanding the increased 
financial resources. Economic convergence between both rims of the Mediterranean still remains 
an issue. In 2008 the average GDP per capita in the EU-27 (in PPP terms) was still five times the 
average GDP per capita in MPCs. Were the current annual average growth rates to be 
maintained at around 5-6%, the economic catching-up process to reach 50% of the EU’s average 
GDP per capita would take decades (estimates by Go-EuroMed range from 22 years for Lebanon 
to 111 years for Jordan). This clearly proves that although MPCs are growing steadily, they do it 
at insufficient rates for closing the prosperity gap and in a rather non sustainable manner since 
economic growth is not generating enough jobs to prevent unemployment rates from growing.  
 
The EU has also faced fierce resistance from MPCs to implement some core politically sensitive 
reforms such as, for instance, the overall dismantling of trade tariffs, the gradual elimination of 
inefficient subsidy schemes, and the overhaul of the judiciary system. In addition, tangible 
benefits to the populations of MPCs in terms of poverty reduction have been hard to materialize. 
Many interventions have helped to improve the management of national institutions and the 
economic resilience to external shocks, but these improvements have not always been passed 
onto the final beneficiaries.  
 
MEDA programme’s successor, the European Neighbourhood Partnership Instrument (ENPI) was 
endowed with €12 billion of budgetary grants for the 2007-13 financial framework period. This is 
32% more than the €8.5 billion allocated in the previous 2000-06 period (divided between the 
ENPI´s two predecessor instruments: MEDA and TACIS). Of these € 12 billion, only the country 
programmes for the Southern Mediterranean countries account for almost € 3 billion.  
 
The ENPI also includes two new features: i) the Governance Facility with an allocation of €300 
million which has rewarded partner states with additional funding on the basis of an evaluation of 
the good performance in the implementation of the Actions Plans; and ii) the Neighbourhood 
Investment Fund (NIF) with an allocation of €700 million which has provided grant money to 
leverage lending and investment resources from International Financial Institutions (IFIs), 
particularly the European Investment Bank (EIB) and the European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (EBRD). For MPCs, the NIF coexist with the Facility for Euro-Mediterranean 
Investment and Partnership (FEMIP), which gives the EIB access to European Commission 
(COM) budgetary resources. Indeed, the EIB has been managing three different types of funds 
made available by the EU (technical assistance, interest rate subsidies, and risk capital) in order 
to create bridges between the EIB banking activities and the economic objectives of the EMP. In 
addition, the EIB has committed to lend from their own funds amounts comparable to the ENPI´s 
grant totalling €12.4 billion for the 2007-13 period, out of which €8.7 billion to the MPCs.  
 
By the volume of funds mobilized by the ENPI and the bilateral approach to economic reforms 
institutionalized by the ENP we can reasonably expect that some MPCs will seize the opportunity 
to reform faster in order to maximize their chances to fully benefit from deeper integration in 
international markets. Some others will hesitate between deeper integration and the risk of 
increasing macroeconomic vulnerabilities.  
 
 
 
 
Graph 8 Total ODA 2000-2006 to the EMP countries 
(disbursements in USD billions)  
Member States
9.5
30%
COM
5.5
17%
Other bilateral
13.2
41%
Multilateral 
(excluding COM)
3.8
12%
 
So far, no substantial evaluation of the impact of the ENPI has been carried out. Critics claim that 
the EU has devoted insufficient financial means to achieve the declared goals of promoting a 
common prosperity area and accuse the EU of lack of commitment to the Mediterranean region. 
This statement does not hold in light of the importance of the past EU assistance to the MPCs 
and at the volume of resources committed under the ENPI. The EU invested half of the ODA to 
the Mediterranean region over the period 2000-2006, totalling USD 15 billion (of which USD 5.5 
billion from the COM and USD 9.5 billion from the EU Member States).   
 
However, achieving growth and transforming growth into an engine for economic development is 
not just merely function of pumping financial resources into EMPs. Several features would need 
to be improved in order to achieve the intended objectives of the EMP: 
 
1. The issue of coordination. The EU is a key development actor in the Euro-Mediterranean 
area, but many others donors are also present in the region, which raises major issues or 
coordination between the EU and these lending/investment agencies. Some attempts of 
coordination took place between the COM and the World Bank at the time when the 
Actions Plans were drafted but a more formal operational alliance has not grown to life in 
spite of the benefits that their combined leverage could present. Joining forces among 
donors would prevent MPCs playing donors against each other and would make a 
stronger case for policy-shaping.  
 
2. The issue of the institutional framework. A bulk of literature on aid effectiveness has 
revealed that unless economic aid finds a fertile ground, it will most likely be wasted and 
unable to achieve the intended objectives. Fertile ground implies that MPC economies 
need a more favourable environment, first and foremost improving institutional 
governance by becoming accountable to the public and improving the business 
environment where the private sector can flourish, establish economic growth and jobs. 
 
8.  Conclusions  
 
While facing several fierce external shocks to their economies in the recent past, such as the 
soaring global commodity prices, the countries at the southern Mediterranean rim have been on 
the right track in reforming their economies. However, the most recent shocks related to the 
global economic and financial crisis are breaking trends. Economic growth is slowing down, and 
job losses are following. Opting for the appropriate policies is difficult, not least in view of the fact 
that these economies are relatively vulnerable. The risk of fiscal unsustainability, the relatively 
weak private sector, the high unemployment rates, and weak automatic stabilizers, the shallow 
financial sectors that hampered the rise of economic activity and thus welfare levels in the past, 
and the lack of buffers make it a real challenge to make the right choice of policy measures to 
mitigate or even reverse the impact of the global crisis on their economies. 
 
Maintaining positive growth rates in the years to come will depend, more than ever, on sound 
economic policy choices. MED countries will need to keep creating favourable conditions to 
attract investments, provide job opportunities and increase productivity and exports. Economic 
openness, more than ever, will be conducive for the domestic economies, be it not in the short 
term than in the medium term. This entails further efforts to integrate in regional and international 
markets, keep their markets open, diversify exports and markets, implement investor friendly 
reforms, and assess the cost and benefits of current expenditure policies. By deepening the 
economic and financial integration, rather than by isolating from international markets the MED 
region can reap the benefits of globalisation. The risks and challenges embedded in deeper 
economic integration can be balanced by introducing buffers in the form of strengthened 
supervisory and financial regulations and compensatory measures for the sectors most likely to 
be touched by increased international competition. 
 
And although countries might not be particularly inclined to undertake further reform efforts in 
times of uncertainty, there may be a window of opportunities to implement some fiscal policy 
measures, e.g. on the better targeting of commodity subsidies, the flexibility of good markets or 
tax collection (see Albers and Peeters 2009). The lower oil prices are a golden opportunity to 
undertake a serious reconsideration of inefficient food and oil subsidy schemes across the region. 
Their removal, when politically feasible, or their gradual phasing out, can provide more leeway for 
the fiscal authorities for discretionary spending. New and more efficient mechanisms to protect 
the more vulnerable layers of these societies need to be developed so the impact of the crisis 
does not fall disproportionally on them. As for monetary policy, countries where Central Banks 
have undertaken reform efforts that have strengthened the prudent management and governance 
of domestic banks are in a better position to weather the global financial storm. Bank's provisions 
of liquidity and monetary easing are helping the economies of Egypt, Israel, Morocco and Tunisia 
by making capital more accessible to private banks in a bid to stimulate lending. However, 
Central Banks would need to carefully monitor inflationary pressures before injecting more 
liquidity into their economies in a bid to further stimulating the economy. A proper balance 
between fiscal and monetary policies needs to be crafted on a case by case basis.  
 
Last but not least, governance and improvements in the institutional framework should remain 
high on the agenda. The legal framework should ensure sufficiently independent public 
institutions. In addition to this, excessive bureaucracy and red tape is to be suppressed, 
transparency and trustworthiness to be augmented and operations have to become efficient, to 
prevent fraud and mismanagement.  
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